“In our society, we have learned the hard way through the misogynistic approach of the highly educated academics that acclaimed Apartheid never existed.  It appears that Jonathan Jansen belongs to this ilk. He has insulted the Minister of Basic Education in a manner reminiscent of the utterances made by the Apartheid ideologues of the old order.  How often did we not hear, African people in particular being described as ‘lazy and stupid’  by well educated professors with internationally recognized credentials? This is a description illustrative of ignorance and prejudice.”

It is worth noting here the irony (some might say double-standard). The ANC believes Jansen should apologize for expressing his “misogynistic”, “ignorant” and “prejudiced” view that Motshekga is lazy and incompetent when the ANC did not ask (let alone demand) that Motshekga apologise for her comments that COPE defectors Terror Lekota and Mluleki George are dogs: “Now that the dogs are leaving, there will be peace and we will be stronger. The dogs arrived in the ANC and they have left.” It’s open to debate which kind of name-calling is worse or when exactly personal opinion slides into personal insult.

More importantly, Duarte’s open letter situates Jansen’s “lazy and incompetent” comment in the racist colonial and apartheid discourse of ‘lazy and stupid natives’. This is quite easy, given last year’s infamous exposé of the UFS’s Reitz men’s hostel (which has since been closed), one of many sites in this country where the long history of racist discourse still finds praxis. The association of this discourse with “well educated professors with internationally recognized credentials” also has a ring of truth about it. Duarte presumably has the likes of Charles Templeman Loram in mind, whose book The Education of the South African Native, published in 1917, was based on his doctoral dissertation at Columbia University:

“… many of our criticisms of the Native as lazy, stupid, unteachable are due to the failure to comprehend his outlook on life. We have failed to realize that the Native does not feel the need for such virtues as punctuality, application, and thoroughness, which are essential to success in our European sense of the word” (p.8).

But just because it’s easy, doesn’t mean it’s accurate. There are a few things going on which I think merit closer attention.

Firstly, Duarte strategy to deflect Jansen’s comments on commitment and competence draws attention to a key issue in the national debate about governance: How much of a factor is demonstrated commitment and proven competence in selecting candidates for top government positions? Or to put it another way, to what extent does demonstrated loyalty to the new powers at Luthuli House outweigh ability and competence in making cabinet appointments? This is a key issue that runs through much recent political controversy in the post-Mbeki era, and if widespread anxiety about the possible appointment of Judge Hlophe to the Constitutional Court is to be believed, it appears now to be overflowing into the judiciary too (though it’s worth noting that Hlophe has not done much to earn Zuma’s reward). But Duarte’s deflections draw attention to this issue on her own account, not on Jansen’s, because I don’t think this is Jansen’s primary focus. This brings us to the second issue, which is the depth of the government’s commitment to improving education. This I think is Jansen’s real concern and his record of publications, both academic and in the popular press, bears this out.

But Jansen shoots from the hip and he has previously targeted the ANC; they are afterall the governing party, with all the responsibilities that entails: Take for example his article Vital Questions for Politicians. Noting that, “Nothing dismays me more than politicians promising things when they know they have neither the will nor the capacity to deliver,” he poses his first question:

“What will your party do if an MEC for education in one of the provinces shows blatant disregard for a scheduled meeting of the minister of education to discuss the opening of the school year, and trots off to attend the court proceedings for the president of her political party?”

The MEC who prompted this question was Angie Matshekga who skipped class to be at one of Zuma’s court appearances. (Read the ANC’s mostly-spin reply here)

More shooting from the hip is Jansen’s article “Long leave, comrades, long leave” which consists of a mocking satirical dialogue in “Sadtu’s political education class 101”:

Cde Justice: “Sorry comrades, I don’t understand. Must we not choose the most competent people for the job, those who can deliver on the needs of the poor?”

Lem: “Listen, you fool, political positions are not about competence! How do you think Comrade Manto kept her job and Comrade Angie got hers? You do not have to be competent; in fact, you do not even have to go to the meetings of senior Cabinet ministers in your portfolio. All you need to do is show up at the right funerals and at the right courts and, before you can say deployment, you’re high up on the party list. Competence is a bourgeoisie word, remember. So go out there and wreck some township schools!”

Provocative stuff perhaps, but off the mark? Depends what you’re aiming at …

Jansen has a proven track record in education and his cv is very impressive.  It is also significant that he is black, which makes him the first black rector in the UFS’s 105 year history (hence Duarte doesn’t outright accuse him of racism). Thankfully Jansen doesn’t appear to share Xolela Mangcu’s inclination towards self-promotion, but like most of the ‘public intellectuals’ who fill our newspapers with their insight and opinion, Jansen cannot be faulted for lack of commitment nor indeed for lack of insight. Regrettably, it seems the ANC, as governing party, can, which is exactly what Jansen’s consistent critique has aimed at.

So we should understand Jansen’s frustration with Matshekga’s appointment to head-up the newly created Ministry of Basic Education, a portfolio that will require considerable commitment, hard work, management and leadership to get functioning within the government’s broad policy framework. A M&G report that Matshekga, who is also the ANCWL President, was “unimpressive” as Gauteng MEC for Education is not comforting: “Once a leading education department, Gauteng has slipped and seems unable to contain the growing education crisis, particularly in township schools.”  (Questions have also been raised about Matshekga’s failures to disclose company directorships in compliance with the provincial legislature’s regulations.)

Which raises another of Jansen’s Questions to Politicians:

“Given the acknowledged failure to deliver in the provinces on noble policies at the national level, would you appoint people to critical positions on the basis of their loyalty to the party, or on the basis of their competence?”

To this one the ANC replied: “The ANC believes that appointments should be based on competence and proven ability to execute.”

The reply continues:

“This is why we have paid increased attention to teacher development, the review of district offices and their effectiveness, and evaluation (with deans of education faculties) of initial teacher education in our universities. Further, the ANC has supported plans to upgrade teacher qualifications through the provision of bursaries. The ANC has also agreed to the establishment of a National Evaluation and Education Development Unit to review and audit education provision and quality on a regular basis. Such a unit will also have a remit to focus on skills and competence in schools, districts and provincial departments.” (emphasis mine)

All of which are noble statements of intent and commitments at the national level -which won’t be followed through unless critical positions like national minister are appointed based on competence and proven ability to execute.

Duarte’s reframing of Jansen’s critique as complicit with misogyny and the discourse on ‘lazy and incompetent natives’, by obfuscating the difference between incompetence and racist/sexist prejudice, resituates the critique from a concern with capability and capacity to discrimination. Thus Duarte establishes a false choice, as President Obama would say, between meritocracy and accountability on the one hand, and prejudice and discrimination on the other, as if aspiring to the former means sacrificing our national commitment to combating the latter. Sadly, the ANC perpetuates this false dichotomy as a quick and effective means to neutralize criticism. It does a disservice to itself, our history and our future.

But increasingly this strategy is less persuasive. Partly this is because the critique emanates from black intellectuals and professionals. They are harder to pin as racists than their white counterparts, and thus we increasingly see references to their supposed elitism and distance from the grass roots, which has the knock-on effect of giving currency to poor education and proximity to ‘the masses’, as we have seen with the rise of Julius Malema (recall his triumphalist performance at UCT on the eve of the election). But more importantly, and more sadly, the fallacity is shown up by poor pass rates, deteriorating teacher morale, and school violence, all indicators of incompetence and poor leadership, despite notable policies designed to address these challenges.

On this day, a decade and a half ago, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela was formally elected as the first President of a democratic South Africa. At that moment a new nation was born, a nation founded on the fundamental principles of human dignity and equal rights for all.  A nation founded on the promise that ‘never, never and never again’ would this land experience the oppression of one by another. Today, a decade and a half later, we gather here to reaffirm the promise of that great day.
We gather here determined to renew that most solemn undertaking, to build a society in which all people are freed from the shackles of discrimination, exploitation, want and disease.

We gather here determined that the struggles and sacrifices of our people over many decades shall not be in vain.
Instead, they shall inspire us to complete the task for which so much blood was shed, and so much hardship endured. This is a moment of renewal.
When Madiba took the oath of office on the 10th of May 1994, it was one of the greatest historic moments of our country, Africa and the African diaspora. Madiba healed our wounds and established the rainbow nation very firmly.

He set us on the path of nation building and prosperity and made us a respected member of the world community of nations. He taught us that all South Africans have equal claim to this country, and that there can be no lasting peace unless all of us, black and white, learned to live together in harmony and peace.

He made reconciliation the central theme of his term of office. We will not deviate from that nation-building task. Thank you Madiba, for showing us the way.
I would also like to acknowledge the former second Deputy President of the democratic republic, the Hon FW de Klerk, who worked with Madiba in the resolution of the apartheid conflict, and participated in shaping a new South Africa.

Your Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen,In June 1999, former President Mbeki came to this very podium to take the oath of office, as the second President of the Republic. He took the country forward as a true statesman.
He made a remarkable contribution towards strengthening our democracy, and laid a firm foundation for economic growth and development.

He made our country an integral part of the continent and worked tirelessly for an African rebirth. Through his leadership, South Africa’s stature grew in the continent and globally.

In his last address to the nation as Head of State in September last year, he demonstrated his patriotism, and put the interests of the country above his personal interests.Thank you Zizi for demonstrating a character that the ANC had always embodied since 1912.

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentleman, the nation is equally indebted to my friend, comrade and brother, President Kgalema Motlanthe. He came into office during a period of great anxiety, and brought about calm, stability and certainty. He has led us in a very capable manner and the transition has become remarkably smooth and well managed. On behalf of the nation, let me express our sincerest gratitude to President Motlanthe for patriotic service to the nation. Motlanthe! Bakone! Mmadiboka, seboka, dikgomo lebatho!

Today, as I take this solemn Oath of Office as the Fourth President of the Republic of South Africa, I do so deeply conscious of the responsibilities that you, the people of our country are entrusting in me. I commit myself to the service of our nation with dedication, commitment, discipline, integrity, hard work and passion.

There is a lot to be done. More than 11,6 million South Africans voted for the ANC, based on the programme put before them.We are now called upon to implement our Manifesto. The dreams and hopes of all the people of our country must be fulfilled. There is no place for complacency, no place for cynicism, no place for excuses.Everything we do must contribute in a direct and meaningful way to the improvement of the lives of our people.Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, Your Excellencies,

We make a commitment here and now, before the eyes of the world, that:

For as long as there are South Africans who die from preventable disease;
For as long as there are workers who struggle to feed their families;
For as long as there are communities without clean water, decent shelter or proper sanitation;
For as long as there are rural dwellers unable to make a decent living from the land on which they live;
For as long as there are women who are subjected to discrimination, exploitation or abuse;
For as long as there are children who do not have the means nor the opportunity to receive a decent education;
For as long as there are people who are unable to find work, we shall not rest, and we dare not falter.

As we apply ourselves to these and other tasks, we must acknowledge that we find ourselves in difficult economic times. Jobs are being lost in every economy across the world. We will not be spared the negative impact, and are beginning to feel the pinch. However, the foundations of our economy are strong and we will need to continue to build on them. This will require more hard work than ever before.

To achieve all our goals, we must hold ourselves to the highest standards of service, probity and integrity. Together we must build a society that prizes excellence and rewards effort, which shuns laziness and incompetence.

We must build a society that draws on the capabilities, energy and promise of all its people.
Fellow South Africans, this is indeed a moment of renewal.

It is an opportunity to rediscover, that which binds us together as a nation.

The unity of our nation should be a priority for all sectors of our society.
We are a people of vastly different experiences, of divergent interests, with widely different views.
Yet we share a common desire for a better life, and to live in peace and harmony.
We share a common conviction that never shall we return to a time of division and strife.
From this common purpose we must forge a partnership for reconstruction, development and progress.
In this partnership there is a place for all South Africans, black and white.
It is a partnership founded on principles of mutual respect and the unfettered expression of different views. We do not seek conformity.
We seek a vibrant, dynamic partnership that is enriched by democratic debate that values diverse views and accommodates dissent.

Therefore, we need to make real the fundamental right of all South Africans to freely express themselves, to protest, to organise, and to practice their faith.
We must defend the freedom of the media, as we seek to promote within it a greater diversity of voices and perspectives.
We must deepen the practice of participatory democracy in all spheres of public life.
We must strengthen the democratic institutions of state, and continually enhance their capacity to serve the people.
We must safeguard the independence and integrity of those institutions tasked with the defence of democracy, and that must act as a check on the abuse of power.

Compatriots, today, we enter a new era in the history of our nation, imbued with a resolve to do everything within our means to build a better life for all our people.

Today, we renew our struggle to forge a nation that is at peace with itself and the world.
As we rejoice in being surrounded by our friends from all over the world, we reiterate our gratitude for the sterling contribution of the international community to our struggle for freedom.

We single out the African continent, for refusing to rest until the southern tip of Africa was free.
We recommit ourselves to continue to be an active member of the international community.
We will continue to use multilateral and bilateral forums and relations to take forward the goals of eradicating global poverty, strengthening peace and security and to promote democracy.

We will promote international friendship and cooperation through amongst others the 2010 FIFA World Cup. South Africa will deliver a world class event that will forever change the perceptions of the international community, and also ensure a lasting legacy for the people of Africa.
Fellow South Africans, let us move forward decisively, together.

Let us build a nation that remains forever mindful of its history, of those who have sacrificed so much, and the many who put down their lives so we can be here today.

A nation filled with the laughter and joy of children.
A nation filled with a hope born of the knowledge that if we work together, we will achieve our dreams.
Your Majesties, Your Royal Highnesses, Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, thank you for gracing this occasion today.

I thank you.

“You common cry of curs … I banish you!

And here remain with your uncertainty ….

There is a world elsewhere!”

With these words, Shakespeare’s Coriolanus storms out of Rome, after having been exiled by the tribunes of the people. The play of the same name is one of Thabo Mbeki’s favourites, and I could not stop thinking about it as I watched his downfall over the past year.

Coriolanus was banished from Rome for refusing to bend to the will of the people. Similarly, Mbeki was banished from the ANC at Polokwane for his perceived high-handedness and aloofness, which came across as callous and isconnected. His alleged victimisation of Jacob Zuma might have been the rallying cause, but this accusation fell on fertile ground because of his perceived lack of responsiveness to his comrades and their aspirations.

Mbeki performed the spectacularly self-destructive feat at Polokwane of telling the very people whom he wished to vote him back into office that they were a rabble, not worthy of being at the conference in the first place — suggesting that they had been easily misled and manipulated because they had “very little familiarity with the history
and traditions of the ANC”. So he confirmed to the delegates what the  Zuma camp had already told them: he was an elitist who was contemptuous of them because they were not as educated and as informed as he.

As I look back over the past year, the defining moment of Mbeki’s fall seems to me not to have been in September 2008, when he was fired from office, but 10 months previously, at Polokwane. And the realisation of this moment seemed to come not when he lost the election, but as he wrapped up his epic political report: “If we are divided, what divides us?” he asked.

“You!” came the answer, shouted — somewhat uneasily — from various corners of the floor. Mbeki looked up, a flicker registering across his habitually impassive features. He tried his question another way: “If we are divided, what should we do to address this challenge …?”

The delegates gave Mbeki his answer: “Go! Go!”

A few minutes later there was respectful, if restrained, applause — and then the open rebellion of “Umshini Wam!“.

Mbeki and his supporters had characterised the Zuma crowd as “howlers”, as “hooligans”; that “common cry of curs”. Even now, a year later, one of the mobilising tactics of the new opposition Congress of the People
(Cope) is to claim this behaviour — like the crude attacking style of Julius Malema — to be anathema to the movement. It remains to be seen how effective this approach will be for Cope, but the evidence suggests that what South Africans euphemistically call “robust politics” — the shouting past rather than talking to one’s opponent — has caused the
statistically insignificant but symbolically powerful desertion from the ANC of the black middle class.

But at Polokwane, at least, Mbeki’s failure was that he was unable to see that the “traditions” honed in exile– mission-school politesse in the service of rigid military hierarchy and “democratic centralist” control — no longer applied in the same way in a free, democratic South Africa. Zuma — ever the canny intelligence operative — understood this: his victory was based on his ability to have his ears to the ground and thus to be able to project himself as responsive,
accountable, a man of the people.

In contrast, Mbeki’s belief against all evidence to the contrary that he would prevail was a vindication of one of the most trenchant critiques of his administration: his disconnection from his electorate, exacerbated by the insulation that inevitably comes with high office.

I was at Polokwane and, like most observers present, I witnessed it as both exhilarating and brutal: the rough practice of democracy but also something of a regicide.

However much Mbeki might have been the architect of his own downfall, it was deeply distressing to witness the ire with which he was rejected. As I watched a younger comrade gratuitously insult a venerable elder — “Go back into exile if you don’t like it,” he spat — I felt I was witnessing not just generational rebellion, but the turning in on itself of a large and unwieldy family that had been held together too long by mutual interest rather than affection.

This reminded me of the extent to which the ANC was governed by atavistic emotion rather than the logic of a modern political party, even now, at this supposedly democratic watershed.

Later, as I listened to the accounts of the 14 hours it took the NEC to oust Mbeki after the Chris Nicholson judgement, I was struck again by how much the decisions of the ruling party were coloured by grievance and how the desire for vengeance, even if self-destructive, governed  the ANC’s decision to oust him.

At Polokwane and then after the Nicholson judgement, Mbeki was not merely defeated and then fired. He was cast out of his family — even if he claimed that the “values” of this family had been usurped by parvenus. It should not be surprising, then, that he crashed after Polokwane, and that his behaviour seemed only to vindicate his detractors.

In January 2008, he was asked by the SABC whether the concerns expressed at the conference were legitimate. “No. Not at all,” he responded, explaining that he avoided public places such as shopping malls because “as soon as people see me, it becomes very disruptive”.

In his last State of the Nation address in February he used Dickens — “it was the best of times, it was the worst of times” — to acknowledge, finally, that the South Africa he governed was in a state of distress and confusion. But, as Jeremy Cronin has acutely observed, he lost this opportunity to take the nation into his confidence and retreated into his default position: everything would be all right; he was in control.

He was not. He all but disappeared from the public eye during a period in which — unencumbered by the need to seek office again — he might have been unprecedentedly bold. It had been expected that he might step down voluntarily or at the very least draw the new ANC leadership into government in some kind of intra-party coalition. He did neither and instead continued to govern with only the minimum consultation necessary with his new political leaders at Luthuli House. Most provocatively, he went ahead with the controversial appointment of a new board to the SABC.

If Mbeki did “crash” after Polokwane, this was evident in his reaction to the two events that turned the nation in on itself in early 2008: the power crisis and the wave of xenophobic violence that left at least 42 dead and thousands more displaced. Mbeki did, in fact, apologise publicly for the former and also made a strong statement against the
xenophobic attacks. But in both cases his response was late and distant; his executive authority barely ­discernible.

Unlike Zuma, for example, he did not visit the affected areas of the violence, leaving the country instead to address a conference in Japan entitled Towards A Vibrant Africa: A Continent of Hope and Opportunity. More tangibly, his decision to call in the military came several days too late. There is a strong case to be made that the state could have
done more to stop not only this wave of random violence on a scale not seen since the destabilising days before the 1994 elections, but the moment of intense national gloom and shame that followed.

Once more, I could not but hear the echoes of Coriolanus: “I banish you! … There is a world elsewhere.” The ex-president’s “world  elsewhere”, perhaps, was a refuge he had sought from domestic criticism
throughout his tenure, in the arena of global diplomacy: he spent much of 2008 in Zimbabwe, and in his singular obsession to solve that country’s crisis — particularly given the hostile reaction he attracted for his refusal to condemn Robert Mugabe after the June 2008 elections — he seemed determined to salvage his legacy on the
international stage, as a counterweight to his domestic rejection. As has been often noted, one of the tragic ironies of the Nicholson judgement that saw his firing is that it came the day after he brokered the Zimbabwe peace deal. Retrospectively, however, it is evident that this deal was impossible to implement anyway.

“And here remain with your uncertainty”: 2008 became the darkest year yet in post-apartheid South Africa — because of the power crisis, because of the xenophobic violence, because of a gathering recession that began to hit consumers even before the international credit crisis of September. Property prices plummeted, the rand fell and there was
evidence of the biggest emigration wave since the early 1990s.

After a decade and a half of political stability, the uncertainty arising from Mbeki’s defeat at Polokwane played a significant part in this upheaval. South Africa had entered a second transition, a period not unlike the transition to democracy in the early 1990s: huge expectations from one sector of the population, great anxiety from another; an old executive under Mbeki that appeared to have lost its will to govern, a new one in the wings under Zuma trying to assert its authority and needing to reassure jittery markets.

One of the strongest arguments made in favour of Mbeki’s ousting, during the NEC debate over his future following the Nicholson judgement, was that the president’s “recall” would put an end to the uncertainty of this awkward interregnum. But despite the admirably smooth inauguration of Kgalema Motlanthe, and the skilled way the
acting president — for that, really, is what he is — emphasised continuity while making some sharp and much-needed changes (particularly in health, justice and safety and security), the interregnum remained and the uncertainty grew.

Much of this uncertainty is, of course, bracing. The windows have been opened. Speaking publicly about the ANC for nearly the first time in years, Cyril Ramaphosa said that the party after Polokwane was “almost like a breath of fresh air” where there were “no more holy cows”.

Running a campaign out of Luthuli House rather than a government out of the Union Buildings, the new ANC leadership is not yet locked into the exigencies of bureaucracy; it is in its electoral interests to be open and approachable, willing to talk — and listen — to anyone. This is in marked contrast to the defensive posture of the Mbeki government.

Most noticeable has been the changing profile of the country’s legislature. During the nine months between the fall of the guillotine at Polokwane and the roll of Mbeki’s head after the Nicholson judgement, the new ANC cannily realised that the one way it could assert its authority over the president was through this body’s constitutionally prescribed role of executive oversight. Miraculously, the ANC caucus, which had been a rubber stamp for a decade, began doing
its job — arguably even to a fault: sending back draft legislation, challenging executive appointments, demanding accountability from Cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats.

Had ANC legislators finally found their voices now that the allegedly oppressive lid of Mbeki’s political control was removed, or were they acting as the blunt instrument of the Zuma ANC’s newfound power, setting out to limit and even humiliate Mbeki? And the bigger question: is there a new accountability in the ruling party, or have the windows
merely been thrown open for some spring-cleaning before being slammed shut again as the new ANC hunkers down into power?

Particularly in the way delegates slavishly followed either an “Mbeki list” or a “Zuma list” at Polokwane, there are indications that this might be a mere changing of the guard within the ANC rather than the birth of a much-needed new political practice; that new systems of patronage are merely establishing themselves as loyalties shift from one group of leaders to another. The clearest indicator of this, post-Polokwane, was the sham way that Parliament “consulted” over the dismantling of the Scorpions, when it was clearly following a resolution issued at Polokwane. The unit may indeed have been used by Mbeki to target his adversaries, but ANC parliamentarians failed to offer any compelling reasons why they had disbanded the unit entirely rather than immunising it from political interference.

Much of the unease of this second transition — the anxiety, but also the expectation — has, of course, to do with Zuma himself. And Mbeki stands accused of having bequeathed to the country this particular uncertainty — because of the way he mismanaged both the investigation into Zuma and the political fallout arising from it, and because he did not step aside at Polokwane for someone else to take on Zuma. It is worth recollecting that much of the Zuma vote at Polokwane was an anti-Mbeki one. Mbeki’s decision to make himself available for a third term as ANC president mobilised support against him by people who were at best ambivalent about Zuma, but who were determined that the ANC should not fall victim to that graveyard of African democracies: the ruler-for-life syndrome.

Now that Zuma leads the ANC, the uncertainties grow. Primarily this: will our next president be running the country and standing trial simultaneously? And if he lands up not standing trial, at what cost will this be to our constitutional order? Other questions follow: what is Zuma’s actual commitment to the rule of law? Is he deploying the well-worn demagogic two-step of social conservatism and political radicalism just to win votes, or will the dance set the tone of his new government? How will he steer economic policy through the straits of an international economic crisis while still meeting the needs of his own increasingly expectant constituency?

What, ultimately, does Zuma actually believe and to whom will he be most indebted — the populists and the left who brought him to power, or the businessmen who bankroll him? Or, having been all things to all people during a campaign — hey, he is a politician after all — will he be able to ascend to statesmanship, forging consensus between
sectors of the ANC alliance (and broader society) that have been warring for over a decade now?

As I look back on 2008, I find myself troubled by one particular question about Zuma: why, after so intense a leadership battle, did he not take the job himself after Mbeki was fired? The argument that Motlanthe has more experience is nonsense: Motlanthe had been appointed to the Cabinet barely two months previously, while Zuma had been a provincial minister for five years and deputy president of the country for another six. No: the truth is that Zuma declined the presidency because he was not, yet, in control of the ANC he now led — as was evidenced by the way he lost the debate over Mbeki’s fate (he did not want him to be fired) — and because of his own ambivalence towards power.

Zuma has yet to prove that he is driven by the kind of visionary mission that powered his predecessors, Mandela and Mbeki, rather than by the appetites of his many sponsors and the need to overcome his own travails. And despite the personality cult that has developed around him, he remains divisive, even within the ANC. The now dominant “Zuma
camp” finds itself needing to manage its own fault lines: between those who would, as they publicly said, kill for the ANC president, and those who had backed him to get rid of Mbeki but now worry that they are saddled with a candidate too compromised to run the country effectively.

Where, in all of this, is Mbeki himself? When Coriolanus was banished from Rome he raised an army among Rome’s enemies, the Volscians, to sack his home town. Many in the ANC see Mbeki as the hidden hand behind Cope and accuse him privately of doing something similar. Thus the shrillness and anger from many ANC leaders and comrades: working off the paradigm of a family or a secret society, they perceive Mbeki and his apparent agents as what would have been known in the old days as verraaiers. This is self-deception: the ANC midwifed Cope itself, by firing Mbeki unnecessarily, seven months before he would have stepped down from power anyway.

At the time of writing Cope has an alleged 400 000 members, although its leaders are inarticulate, its brand
untested and its policies undeveloped. Yet the birth of this new political party is surely one of the most salutary benefits of our current uncertainty: the collapse of the de facto one-party state and its replacement by the possibility of a real choice for black South African voters. The ANC can no longer lay claim to being the sole legitimate representative of black South Africans and must compete in the open market of ideasthat is democracy.

Mbeki’s entire life was the ANC and the collapse of the old struggle hegemony is probably the last thing for which he would want to be remembered. But wherever Mbeki’s “world elsewhere” might be — an African leadership institute at Unisa; a life as an international mediator; a redoubt in Riviera where Cope’s lieutenants gather under cover of night — the birth of this new political party is very much part of his legacy, whether he had a hand in it or not.

Mark Gevisser’s abridged and updated second edition of Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred will be published by Jonathan Ball in 2009 He is also working on a new book, The Second Transition

Comrade President Zuma I am not a disgruntled member of the ANC, just angry. I am angry because you sent Jessie and the other President to school but not Malema. I am angry that no one has as yet visited me or given me any answers to where I will find the real ANC, so I hope that you wouldn’t mind if I write to you. I promise I will not write to Thabo, he will not take kindly to that and I may end up with Essop at my door.

I am also angry comrade President that your Minister of Education has banned the works of two performance artists. The good minister is not strong on freedom and democracy let alone freedom of expression. She reminds me of the old Nat cabinet ministers, sorry the white minority racists’ government. Don’t get me wrong – I also find these guys poor exhibitionists. All they are doing like most for our artists is just mimicking Paris and London. But to ban them in this day and age is not on. Does the good minister’s action not remind you of the wardens and censors on the Robben Island?

The Deputy Director-General in the Department of Education (DOE) argued that the art teachers are free to use the work of the artists in the classroom but they must first get the permission of all the parents. Now that is going where even the Nats never ventured. She sounds like our millionaire friend, your old mate from the Mbeki NEC, Smuts.

Please can you deal with this issue, I know you are opposed to censorship. Tell the folks in the DOE do get a life. The kids can download more dangerous nonsense like, for example, Blade’s speeches. If the Minister does not listen, you could deal with her at the list conference or better still why not redeploy her to the Dullah Omar Region. Let her do some leg work and get those comrades back into the movement.

I do have a few more issues about education, health, crime, GEAR, and so on but I will discuss this with you when you and the Terrors decide to visit me. I promise that I will serve you that vile booze that comrades in the Cape ANC drink. I am sure I will get in trouble with the wife, but since you have freed us from the heavy hand of Mbeki and restored democracy I feel free to make my concerns know. I shouldn’t have anything to worry about right?

But let’s leave what we do with the good Minister in charge of the DOE for the ANC list conference. I just hope that it all goes well. I did hear a rumor that some people would like to use it to raise awkward questions from the floor. I learnt from the Sunday Times that our comrade Mbulelo, who was last seen escaping from the troublesome Cape minus his manhood, is also hinting that there are some dark forces in the ANC who are going to remain in the movement – sorry party – and will work to undermine the movement – sorry party – from within.

Now comrade President if you do visit me I could tell you how to deal with the counter revolutionaries. From what I hear many of the counter revolutionaries are our public representatives in parliament who diddled the books. This act of subversion and counter revolution behavior was labeled by the right wing counter-revolutionary white controlled unreconstructed press as Travelgate. You should ask comrade Baleka for their names. You cannot trust anyone anymore. So lets us be vigilant and make sure that they don’t attend the list conference.
I see that your friend and brother swears that he never conspired against you. I know the bugger will say that he did not conspire against Mandela and did not have a hand in engineering Mandela’s humiliation in the NEC. Comrade President, I hope that you were not in any way party to humiliating our former president. I know you are a fearless warrior not afraid of taking anyone on for a good stick fight.

Comrade President I am sure you must be feeling sorry for that old cigar smoking, wine drinking, former Gauteng Premier. It seems that he visited his village and a comrade and son of the soil asked him why he was there when he had not done anything for his village.

Now that son of the soil has the right political attitude. You should send our head of elections to recruit this guy. I sure he will win the chief and his subjects for the National Democratic Revolution. I will bet my government pension that if you were to go to your home village and tell them why you went to Washington no one would question your commitment to the village and the poor.
Comrade President I hope that you are not following in Thabo’s footsteps – every time he had a bee in his bonnet he ran to Washington. You should send Blade in your place; he has a great deal of time on his hands since leaving the IFP. Please stay at home.

One more thing did you speak to the Minister of Arts and Culture about his spokesperson, you know the guy who has a mouth bigger than Terror’s.

Yours,

Omar Badsha.

P.S.
I cannot seem to find the real ANC in the Western Cape.

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Imagine the ANC losing 10% of the 10-million South Africans who voted for it in the last national and local government elections in 2004 and 2006.

Is that a pipe dream or a realistic possibility? It will not happen for as long as the ruling party has to compete only against the existing opposition parties. The official opposition, the DA, won only 13% of voter support in those elections.

But the new ANC, whatever name it takes, represents the most serious threat to the ANC since 1994. It will essentially be a party run by ANC members, embracing the ANC’s vision and values and competing in the same space with Africa’s oldest liberation movement.

The ANC will undoubtedly come back as the ruling party next year but its confused reaction shows that it has been rattled and does not know whether to dismiss the rebels, as Transport Minister Jeff Radebe initially threatened, or offer them an olive branch, as treasurer Mathews Phosa subsequently did.

A conversation with the inner circle of the new initiative reveals that it hopes to capitalise on the 40% of delegates who voted for Thabo Mbeki at Polokwane last year. A former youth leader said it was not true that the new party had lost momentum by not launching immediately after Polokwane. Instead, he insisted that the Jacob Zuma faction’s subsequent takeover of the ANC Youth League congress and provincial ANC conferences, including the removal of premiers associated with Mbeki, showed that the ANC leadership has taken a decision to drive out Mbeki supporters rather than accommodate them.

He said the ANC members associated with Mbeki were also aware that they were unlikely to make it on to the lists for provincial legislatures and Parliament next year. This would leave them out in the cold when many of them are still young enough to make a contribution.

The youth leader said people who had been mistreated since Polokwane were to be found in all the provinces. In theory, at least, 40% of the ANC membership is up for grabs by the new party. But the source said it was the South African public that the new party would target most. “It’s not the party members who put political parties into power — it’s the public. How the new party presents itself to the broader community and how it’s received will be crucial.” The youth leader said a new party does not need a year to make an impact in elections. Two or three months is sufficient.

The only way the ANC could avoid facing the rebels at the polls was to co-opt them into its decision-making structures and promise them positions after the elections next year.

The ANC has opted for a charm offensive to limit the pool of people Mosiuoa Lekota can win over. But it has also given a licence to radicals in the ruling alliance, including communist leader Blade Nzimande and the Youth League, to knock the rebels around. Within the ANC the perception is that the group is much smaller than initially expected. An ANC insider asked what had happened to former ministers Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, Essop Pahad and Ronnie Kasrils.

“They should be the people giving this initiative some gravitas, but they’re staying clear. They can’t claim that other heavyweights will join in later. The fact is that when you start, you need to have an impact.”

Some in the ANC believe that Lekota’s gung-ho leadership style could alienate other leaders thinking of joining and the public.

They also said his launch in Sandton through a “white” medium (Radio 702) was not “strategic” and would not endear him to the ANC working-class supporters he is courting — “unless he is trying to be a black Helen Zille, targeting the middle class”. They also believe his new “coalition of the wounded” will need more than the six months remaining before the election to take off.

The highest levels of disaffection with the current ANC leadership under Zuma has come from the Eastern Cape, Western Cape and the Northern Cape. But the general public’s sentiment and potential voting behaviour is unclear at this early stage. The ANC majority in the Eastern Cape, Western Cape and Northern Cape could be affected. But nationally Lekota will exceed expectations if his grouping wins the support of anything approaching 10% of the electorate.

(Source: Mail and Guardian)

Open Letter to the ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe

South Africa is stuck in a number of interlocking crises: broken families, communities and society; soaring poverty, unemployment and crime; a pervasive air of public corruption; rising racial animosity; battered democratic institutions; rapidly declining public confidence in government’s ability to deliver services; and looming economic problems ahead. The country must deal with these problems in an increasing complex, dangerous and economically volatile world. The ANC and South Africa need a less divisive and more unifying leader, with fresh ideas, to tackle imaginatively the country’s pressing problems. Mbeki and his group at the helm for over a decade now had clearly run out of ideas, direction and energy.

Yet, this is not why he was so vindictively forced out. It was also not because of ideological differences with the disparate coalition of his political enemies rallied around his rival ANC president Jacob Zuma: Mbeki’s centrist economic instincts against the leftist views of the trade unionists and communists or the virginity testing supporters on the traditionalist right. No, it was simply revenge. Those who fell under Mbeki’s sword saw an opening for an eye-for-an-eye retribution. They wanted to humble Mbeki, as they thought the president had humiliated them. But they also wanted to launch a pre-emptive strike, fearing that in his last days in office, Mbeki would use state resources to crush his enemies. They also feared he would set up a commission investigating corruption related to the controversial arms deal, in which Zuma is implicated, or recharge him. Zuma’s supporters are bragging about their triumph, and seeking to purge the government and the party of pro-Mbeki supporters. Anybody critical of Zuma is now increasingly labelled Mbeki loyalists. All the purges are going to destabilise the ANC and paralyse government further. South Africa now faces a leadership vacuum. Yet, Zuma is certainly not the answer.

The very obvious and most sensible solution to the African National Congress and now South Africa’s deepening crisis is to appoint Kgalema Motlanthe, the former trade unionist and deputy ANC leader, appointed as interim president until next year’s general election as the permanent presidential candidate of the ANC. Such is the political crisis that the only way to prevent an implosion of the ANC is to retire both Mbeki and Zuma, who are equally divisive. Zuma’s candidacy as South African president threatens to break up the ANC before it reaches 100 years in four years’ time. It is better to appoint a new leader with the necessary political gravitas, who is above both the Mbeki and Zuma political divisions, and who can rally significant groups in both camps. Right now the two ANC leaders that may be able to do this are most probably only Motlanthe and Mathews Phosa, the ANC Treasurer. The ANC could have prevented this destructive process if Mbeki had long ago stood aside for Motlanthe or any other of the younger talent, Phosa, Cyril Ramaphosa, Nelson Mandela’s preferred successor ahead of Mbeki, and Tokyo Sexwale, the former Gauteng Premier.

This is the obvious solution to unite the ANC and the country, which should have been done a long time before. In the end Mbeki’s selfish insistence to stand for a third term as party leader last year, rather then endorse either of these young Turks, because they criticised him in the past, meant that everybody opposed to Mbeki’s centralised, aloof and prickly reign, temporarily rallied around Zuma to dislodge the former president and his crew. Among the real reasons why many of the more reasonable on the ANC Left have embraced Zuma is the fear that any of the in-waiting, younger and more competent leaders may marginalise, as Mbeki did, not only the Left again, but also the pressing issues of the poor, of deepening democracy, of building stable families and communities and of inclusive nation building.

Furthermore, under Mbeki the democratic institutions have been undermined, ordinary citizens’ participation in policy and decision-making reduced and freedom of expression threatened. Judge Chris Nicholson in his judgement clearing Zuma of corruption charges was critical of the manipulation of public institutions for political ends under the Mbeki administration because the prosecutors did not follow the correct procedures; they did not interview Zuma before they charged him. Yet, in his campaign to quash the corruption charges against him, Zuma and his sometimes violent supporters have attacked the judiciary, democratic institutions, the media and critics to such an extent that the country’s not yet consolidated constitutional system, institutions and values are at the same risk as Mbeki’s previous manipulation of them. But the talent of all of South Africa’s people, whatever their ideology or colour, has also sadly been marginalised under the Mbeki presidency, who sideline even polite critics or different opinion, within the ANC as racists if white or handmaidens of whites if black. Yet, the Zuma camp is now purging everybody associated with Mbeki, and they now label everybody critical of Zuma as Mbeki loyalists. Zuma himself has sued a number of individuals, including this correspondent, in the biggest defamation to date in South Africa, following mild criticisms of his behaviour.

To make inroads into South Africa’s pressing problems will firstly need a less divisive and more unifying leader, and a clean break from the two factions – Mbeki and Zuma – currently paralysing the ANC, government and South Africa. Furthermore, any new leader must show a commitment to the deal with corruption, deepen democracy within the ANC and the country, be inclusive and tackle race and class inequality. The reality is, Zuma may be popular, and have a hardcore, loud and militant support base who are prepared to ‘die’ to have him president, but at the same time, a large proportion of the ANC’s membership disapprove of him with equal gusto. They are unlikely to vote for the ANC when he is the presidential candidate. Furthermore, such is the strength of the opposition against Zuma within the ANC that his administration is likely to be paralysed by log-jams, which will make it difficult to implement pro-poor policies. The lingering questions over Zuma’s involvement in alleged corruption if he does not answer the allegations fully in court will continue to paralyse government, erode public confidence and undermine the democracy. A new South African president will need to tackle a pervasive air of public corruption, which will demand honesty. Judge Nicholson rightly heavily criticised Mbeki and his government for routinely abusing public institutions to launch vendettas against critics. Zuma claimed he could see by the way a woman dresses and sits that she was looking for sex and that he should oblige. With violence against women reaching record levels, such views are not only unconstitutional, but it provides a legitimate cloak for sexist views. Outside the court house, Zuma’s supporters daily shouted abuse the accuser and stoned a woman they thought was her. He said nothing about this.

Zuma’s rape trial exposed the deep divide between the call for women’s equality in South Africa’s model constitution – which has priority to cultural considerations, the ANC, Cosatu and the SACP’s statutes and rhetoric and the archaic public attitudes to women. He gave his backing to traditionalists who want to introduce virginity testing for young girls. Throughout his rape trial and again during his corruption trial, Zuma played the ethnic card, speaking in Zulu in court, inventing new Zulu cultural norms to excuse his appalling sexist attitudes. South Africa is struggling with the consequences of broken, one-parent and child-headed families, caused by the combination of the legacies of apartheid, through its undermining of black male identity, the breaking-up of families because of the migrant work system, the militarisation of society by the apartheid state and the liberation movements violent response to it, the macho male identity culture among both black and white communities, and the consequences of poverty and HIV/Aids. Mbeki had failed to provide progressive leadership on this. Mbeki’s ally Trevor Manuel, the finance minister, said providing income support to vulnerable families will mean these families will spend it on alcohol.

It is hard to see Zuma presenting a progressive response to how to provide stable families, how to make gender equality as set out in the constitution real, and how to set a progressive example of male identity that aligns with the values of the constitution. With South Africa having among the highest HIV/Aids case loads in the world, Zuma believes that having a shower after unprotected sex with a HIV/Aids positive partner will stop infection. He has urged the police to shoot first and ask questions later to combat high crime levels. He will consider the death penalty. He is under fire from his own camp for flip-flopping on economic policy depending on the audience. Zuma has surrounded himself with hard-line demagogues. This will make it difficult for him to bring in new talent from across the colour, ideological and political divide, which is so necessary to energise the country, but which Mbeki has not done.

Under Mbeki, only a relatively small black middle classes benefited from affirmative action, and a dozen oligarchs from black economic empowerment. The white middle class, with the social capital, education and property acquired during apartheid and white business did well too. Yet the majority black poor and working class, and those eking out a living in the informal sector were marginalised. Many rightfully fear Zuma will be held hostage by the special interests, big black business oligarchs, such as the casino magnate Vivien Reddy, the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) moguls Don Makwanazi and the Shaik family, and arms companies like Thint, of which Zuma is alleged to have been bribed to shield them from prosecution.

Competent and decisive leadership is now required to lift the economy, not populism. Economic growth is slowing, inflation and costs are rising, and power shortages are undermining production, while high unemployment and poverty persist, service delivery remains poor, and ANC supporters are demanding urgent redistribution; all this amid the global financial disaster. Zuma has reassured the markets that the post-Mbeki government will steer the same economic path as Mbeki. President Motlanthe has been handed a new government report (Towards a 15-year Review) by his predecessor that concedes that in spite of growth levels averaging 5% the past years, not enough has been done to slash poverty and inequality, and to increase trust in government. Problems identified five years ago had proved more ‘deep-seated’ than previously recognised, Joel Netshitenzhe, head of policy coordination and advisory services, said: ‘Growth has exposed weaknesses … the increase in the rate of growth does not necessarily result in a reduction in poverty.’ Nor had growth reduced inequality, but had rather created a bigger gap between the rich and poor, as Netshitenzhe outlined: ‘The state has had to learn new ways of doing things as it implemented, but not always have these been decisive and flexible enough.’

The Left’s backing for Zuma is not likely to give them much influence on economic policy. They may be consulted more regularly, of course, but will be told, as Mbeki told them before, that the government cannot risk unsettling the markets. Zuma will have to pay back other supporters – the BEE oligarchs, who were marginalised under Mbeki, but who are now sponsoring Zuma. Others who lost out on the gravy train will want their slice of the pie too. Cosatu and the SACP will have to compete with them for Zuma’s ear. The ANC’s allies, the SA Congress of Trade Unions and the SA Communist Party, are demanding to be upgraded as ‘full partners’ instead of junior partners as under Mbeki. Blade Nzimande of the SACP says it wants more of its members on the ANC’s candidate list for the 2009 elections, and more appointed as national and provincial ministers, mayors and local councillors, with a ‘deployment committee’ to pick its people. It has just concluded a policy conference, ahead of an alliance summit with Cosatu and the SACP; Nzimande says the summit should veto government policy.

Instead of stopping the legal problems of Zuma, forcing out Mbeki has actually only increased Zuma’s legal woes. When announcing that Mbeki was ‘recalled’ as president, Gwede Mantashe, the ANC general secretary had said: ‘The National Prosecuting Authority’s decision to appeal the judgment has become a worry and a point of division for the ANC.’ The reality is that Zuma still has very real 16 charges of corruption against him. Judge Chris Nicholson, who cleared Zuma on a technicality – the prosecutors had followed the wrong procedure – emphasised he did not give a verdict on the charges, but proposed the prosecutors recharge Zuma, provided they do so by the book. To rescue their own credibility, the prosecutors have no other choice but to appeal and recharge Zuma.

Moreover, the prosecutors have been under such an attack from Zuma militants now that their very credibility may rest on successfully recharging Zuma. In any event, they know that if Zuma comes to power, the prosecuting unit may be broken up, with members of the team that have been prosecuting Zuma likely be ‘redeployed’ elsewhere, or simply put under pressure to resign. Furthermore, even if the prosecutors did bow under the pressure and did not prosecute, a number of private prosecutions against Zuma have been lined up – so it is difficult to see how Zuma is going to extricate himself out of this, which have already seen his former financial advisor sent to jail for 15 years. The National Prosecuting Authority has now confirmed that it had applied to appeal against the ruling that sprang Zuma free on a technicality. Mbeki has also formally approached the Constitutional Court to ask that Judge Nicholson’s findings be declared unconstitutional and set aside; he says the judgement was ‘vexatious, scandalous and prejudicial’, cost him his job and damaged his good name and reputation. Zuma is opposing Mbeki’s bid to clear his name. If Mbeki won, his sacking by the ANC’s executive would be shown to be based on false assumptions, and therefore void.

Following Mbeki’s forced exit, the Zuma coalition, consisting of five distinctly different groups, who were all opposed to Mbeki, have lost the glue that hold them together – opposition to Mbeki. Furthermore, with Mbeki gone, all of them are now focusing on securing their own interests in the leadership vacuum. Within the Zuma coalition, not all are set on securing the presidency of South Africa for Zuma. Those who are, though include: the ANC youth league, the pro-Zuma black economic empowerment business oligarchs – both hoping to secure patronage; the Communist Party and the trade unionists, who nave no alternative presidential candidate of their own, think they can manipulate Zuma in power; and those ANC leaders who are being investigated by the National Prosecuting Authority for corruption, because, they argue that if Zuma’s case is quashed – especially when he comes to power, theirs will also. So, now the Zuma coalition are divided between those who want Zuma at all costs to become president, such as those seeking a pardon for corruption or patronage, versus those who are prepared to look for a unifying ANC leader that will be pro-poor, the latter include the more serious elements of Cosatu and the SACP. Yet, Zuma is not entirely in control of his own coalition. Ahead of Mbeki’s ouster, he opposed efforts to oust Mbeki, because he feared he will inherit a divided party, unprepared to run a general election. However, he was rudely overruled by his own militants.

Furthermore, in the week when Mbeki detractors within the Zuma coalition moved to oust him, all the old presidential rivals of Mbeki, Cyril Ramaphosa, Mathews and Tokyo Sexwale, again took centre stage within the ANC, dwarfing Zuma, almost like a decade ago. Zuma initially wanted Baleka Mbete, the Speaker of Parliament, and the ANC’s chairwoman, a more pliable supporter, as caretaker president. However, he lost out on that. Until yesterday, the Zuma camp, in control of the ANC had planned to appoint Baleka Mbete, the Speaker of Parliament, as interim president, to smooth the way for Zuma and to create an environment for Zuma’s legal charges to be withdrawn. Motlanthe was the choice of those in the Zuma coalition, who are more interested in keeping the ANC united, and securing a pro-poor government focus, rather then putting Zuma into the presidency. They have long seen him as an alternative candidate for the presidency if Zuma stumbles over his legal hurdles. Motlanthe does things by the book. In this crisis, their may be openings for other Young Turks of Motlanthe’s generation. To contain the Young Turks – Motlanthe, Phosa, Sexwale and Ramaphosa, Zuma has promised to stay as president for one term only, and then allow a competitive election for the leadership between them. But Mothlante obviously now has the inside track, because he is already an MP, the others, including Zuma are not. He will be presiding president for six months, which is enough to show his credentials not only as a unifying figure, but a source of new ideas, energy and principle, and to contrast this to the divisive potential of a populist Zuma.

Under the Mbeki administration, corruption was often only selectively punished, depending on one’s closeness to Mbeki’s inner circle. A number of ANC leaders under investigation for corruption support Zuma’s attempts not to stand trial, on the basis that their cases will also be cleared. This week parliament has started winding down the National Prosecuting Authority’s elite crime fighting unit, the Directorate of Special Operations, known as the Scorpions, which brought the corruption charges against Zuma. The Zuma dominated ANC leadership voted to have the Scorpions, South Africa’s most effective crime-busting disbanded, claiming it was used for political ends, when it investigated Zuma and other ANC leaders for corruption. With the country awash with crime, the best solution is not to close down the most effective crime fighting unit. A better solution would have been to expanded democratic oversight over the Scorpions, and intelligence, defence and security services. While, all eyes were focused on the transition from Mbeki to Motlanthe, the Zuma-dominated ANC parliamentary caucus slipped in a decision to cancel outstanding monies owned by individual ANC MPs who were defrauded parliament’s travel voucher scheme, dubbed ‘travelgate’, to stop outside civil actions against them to recover the money. Parliament had tasked liquidators to recover outstanding monies from MPs implicated in the travel voucher fraud, which amounted to R6 million. More than 100 MPs, including some ministers, who implicated in defrauding parliament’s travel scheme for MPs.

One worrying now also is that the division between the ruling party and the state is now increasingly blurred. In fact, South Africa is in danger now of becoming a party-state or ‘partocracy’ where there is no clear firewall between the executive, legislatures, and public institutions on the one hand, and the ruling ANC, on the other. Yet, the country constitutional democratic system demands a clear division between the party on the one hand, and the state and public institutions on the other. The problem is also that ANC leadership under Mbeki and now again under Zuma, assumes that they are the South African nation, or euphemistically, the ‘people’ itself, rather then its representatives. This means every decision taken by the ANC leadership is viewed as a good for the country, without consulting the wider nation. It also means that decisions that are often purely factional ones are seen as in the interest of the nation as a whole.

Of course there are many problems inherent in a party-state. The one is that if the party is paralysed by factional fights, tainted by corruption or run undemocratically, the country are also likely to be. Turning into party-states are one of the reasons why many African countries run by former independence or liberation movements have failed to institute broad-based democracy when they came to power. When the ruling independence or liberation movements became corrupt, undemocratic or divided into factions, or the leadership become personalised, their governments became so also, stunting a democratic, development and service delivery efforts. Can the worse effects of party-state or ‘parto-cracy’ be reversed?

The first thing is that the ANC must become more internally democratic. The truth, although the ANC’s Polokwane conference has made a call for greater internal democracy in the party, little has change. A case in point is the face that Zuma is currently explaining to ANC provinces, branches and ordinary members why Mbeki was so brutally pushed when he only had six months to go. The decision should have been canvassed among the membership, branches and provinces before. An integral part of becoming more internal democratic is to make the ANC’s internal elections more democratic. South Africa’s electoral system that allows the party bosses, rather than the ordinary people, to decide who should be candidates for parliament, provincial legislatures and local government should be scrapped. This means that the elected representatives are more accountable to the welfare of the party bosses rather than to the people and to defend the constitution – to which they pledged allegiance when elected.

It is even more urgent now that South Africa adopt a new electoral system, as already proposed in 2004 by the electoral task team headed by Frederick Van Zyl Slabbert, to give more say to ordinary people, rather than the party, and which make elected candidates are accountable to their constituencies and allow them to be recalled by their constituencies, if they fail to deliver. Secondly, democratic institutions, the judiciary, parliament and audit institutions must become more vigilant and assert to defend the democracy, constitution and its values. Thirdly, civil movements, non-governmental organisations and the media must do so also. Fourthly, ordinary citizens must also assert their rights more, and hold government and public institutions accountable.

Finally, South Africa’s opposition parties must get more serious, adopt more relevant policies, actually do the hard work of establishing proper and working branches and elect more competent leaders. Faced with the real prospect of Zuma likely to become president of South Africa, some ANC members have said they will form their own party, to challenge a Zuma-led ANC in next year’s general election. Mbeki’s 92-year old mother, Epainette, a struggle icon in her own right, has said she will support such a new breakaway party ‘100%’. This shows the extent of the dissatisfaction among the ANC rank-and-file. The absence of an effective and relevant opposition party in South Africa remains one of the biggest shortcomings of the country’s infant democracy.

The main reason why the ANC under Mbeki has been so complacent, and why Mbeki was ultimately forced out, is because the party had no opposition to fear it if messed up, that could dislodge it. Only when a ruling party faces the real prospect of losing an election, will South Africa’s politics be infused with the electoral dynamism the country so desperately needs to renew its faltering democracy and provide a better life for it’s people. Before the ANC’s Left components, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party, in one last gamble in 2005, decided to rally behind Jacob Zuma, in an attempt to change the direction of the ANC, each of them had already resolved to combine forces and form a party of the Left. Both the memberships of Cosatu and the SACP resolved in 2005 to form a new party, if they could not sway the ANC to become more pro-poor. However, when Mbeki fired Zuma for corruption in 2005, the latter joined forces with the leaders of the unionists and communist party, and signed a pact that instead of them forming their own party, they should back him (Zuma) for the ANC presidency, and he would in turn make the ANC more pro-poor.

Whether a breakaway party will be formed depends on whether Zuma becomes the president of South Africa. If Motlanthe is given the job permanently, and unite the ANC, pursue a pro-poor agenda and deepen the democracy within the country and the ANC, the disaffected ANC members are more likely to stay. Or if they go, a new party may have less legitimacy. If Zuma becomes president of South Africa, the chances of a breakaway party being set up will increase. Ultimately, if it happens, the success of a breakaway party will also depend on the policies and leadership at the helm. It will only work if its leaders and reason of existence is genuinely pro-poor, for deepening democracy and for equitable redistribution. The current crop of opposition parties in South Africa are irrelevant because they don’t differ from the ANC on policies if they do the policies are on the right, rather than pro-poor or to deepen democracy, or on the unrealistic far-left or Africanist. The parties are often one-man or woman and a fax machine, no deep-rooted branches, credible policies. Yet, in the long-term it will be better for the democracy if the ruling ANC/SACP/Cosatu tripartite alliance is reconfigured – the forcing out of Mbeki will now bring that closer.

Ultimately, the best solution for South Africa is the breakaway of the ruling ANC tripartite alliance into centre-left faction, and its left faction, and the assortment of current opposition parties on the centre-right. Of course, if Zuma becomes president of South Africa, the country won’t implode, yet, but it will just plod along business as usual, democracy, protection and development for the well-off and politically well-connected, and pockets of wealth, service delivery and excellence, for the few, and continuing poverty and tyranny for the majority. Mbeki’s enforced early exit and the ANC leadership’s attempt to push Zuma into the South African presidency at all costs, and the inevitable backlash thereof, are providing the political earthquake South Africa needed to reconfigure its politics.

William M. Gumede is a senior associate and Oppenheimer fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford, and author of Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC.

(Source: Pambazuka News)

For more articles by William Gumede check out: http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/williamgumede

If Zuma cannot muster enough support for calm deliberation to prevail in the ANC then it will further demonstrate that he is beholden to the Nzimandi’s, Malema, Vive Axix.

The only way to save the ANC from tearing itself apart is if Lekota and his group can muster support from one third of the branches of the ANC to call for the convening of a special congress. This conference would discuss the issues that Lekota has put on the table which would go a long way towards healing the rift and institute genuine reform within the ANC. However, the possibility of a special conference being convened is highly unlikely.

President Zuma should take note that it is on his watch that the ANC is facing a serious split. That it is under his watch watch that there is a real possibility of the ANC is going to loose a number of provinces.

It is clear that Lekoto and Co. have thrown down the gauntlet and shifted the debate on a number of crucial issues. Lekoto’s evoking the demands of the Freedom Charter that “all shall be equal before the law” means that the ANC cannot convincingly go to the electorate to argue that charges against President Zuma should be politically resolved. Zuma is going to be charged and the ANC will have to accept that he will have to have his day in court.Let the court decide if Zuma is guilty of corruption or not.

President Zuma can win the support of the country if he comes out categorically against corruption and nepotism by supporting the call for the institution of a judiciary inquiry into the arms deal.  President Zuma will get the support of the country if he would support the call for a judiciary inquiry to be held into whether Mbeki misused his office to undermine parliament and if he had undermined the rule of law by protecting criminal elements in his administration.

Zuma can instill confidence in the ANC as the torch bearer of our freedom struggle and the country’s new constitution should he decline being nominated as President of the country. The destiny of the ANC and the well being of the country is in your hands. Do the right thing comrade President  Zuma

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